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THE WAY AHEAD FOR JOINT TRANSFORMATION
When our comprehensive review is complete, I will expect the military's budget priorities to match our strategic vision -not the particular visions of the Services, but a joint vision for change.
George W. Bush, Speech to the Citadel, September 23, 1999 Successful joint transformation requires a systematic approach utilizing common frameworks and interface implementations to describe, develop, and field joint operational concepts and interoperable capabilities. The stakes are very high, both in dollars and combat capability for now and in the future. This paper analyzes current Department of Defense transformation approaches, compares them to current Service efforts and describes several initiatives needed to develop a common transformation framework in order to more effectively field joint warfighting capabilities.
BACKGROUND
Transformation has been occurring throughout military history as nations have changed military equipment, organization, and employment concepts either to respond to defeats or exploit emerging opportunities. But unlike the past, where Services developed transformational capabilities such as helicopter air mobile-warfare, carrier aviation, and stealth aircraft armed with precision guided munitions, the United States is now attempting large-scale, multi-discipline transformation to develop truly joint warfighting capabilities superior to any threat that may emerge.
The term "transformation" first entered the current force structure debate in 1997. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) committed the Department of Defense (DoD) to transforming to reflect the changing threat and funding realities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. no longer faced a superpower adversary; it no longer made sense in terms of budgets and missions to sustain the existing cold war force structure.
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Now that the U.S. does not face a peer competitor, the military is being re-designed to face future threats based on projected capabilities instead of a well-defined adversary. Hard choices need to be made concerning force structure, continuing legacy acquisition programs, and research required for new capabilities. Transformation poses radical questions regarding force structure and system development with considerable resources at stake. As part of the FY2003 budget, the President requested a significant increase in funding to support transformation. A $48B increase over FY2002 funding levels funded thirteen new transformational programs and accelerated funding for 22 existing programs.
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There are substantial concerns on how to balance force structure and transformation. On one hand, U.S. military forces need to meet current commitments and counter near term threats through 2010 including presumed anti-access strategies and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. We must also face the challenge of "reengineering for more capability for less cost."
3 On the other hand, there is the possibility that asymmetric technical breakthroughs available to adversaries post 2010 could render the current force structure vulnerable, if not obsolete, if the U.S. does not develop and field advanced capabilities and operating concepts.
To successfully meet future asymmetric challenges, the U.S. needs to choose its near-term transformation investments wisely without closing out other potential efforts. With transformation now a central theme of current national security policy, it is time to examine the current Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) transformation approach and analyze its capability to successfully implement joint transformation.
CURRENT TRANSFORMATION APPROACHES

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Following up with campaign themes, President Bush elevated transformation into a major section of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Overall, OSD guidance states that:
"Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate."
5
In addition, "Transformation must therefore be focused on emerging strategic and operational challenges and the opportunities created by these challenges."
6
Instead of providing a single joint direction, Secretary Rumsfeld tasked each of the Services to produce individual transformation roadmaps to develop the capabilities required to meet six critical operational goals:
• Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery;
• Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective information operations;
• Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats;
• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains;
• Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and
• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.
In addition to the six operational goals, the QDR adds that the DoD approach to transformation rests on four pillars:
• Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint training, and an expanded joint forces presence policy;
• Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as standing joint forces through wargaming, simulations and field exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities;
• Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through multiple intelligence collection assets, global surveillance and reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination; and • Developing transformational capabilities through increased and wide-ranging science and technology, selective increases in procurement, and innovations in DoD processes." "…a continuous process that creates a culture of innovation, which in turn seeks to exploit and shape the changing conduct of military competition. The Army will explore new combinations of concepts, people, organizations, and technology in order to produce new or increased capabilities, and protect against asymmetric threats."
10
This transformation process will change the Army "into a force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations." Following this approach, the Army is moving forward with an extensive effort to transform into a lighter, more lethal force resulting in a force structure very different from the one it currently owns. "A process by which the military achieves and maintains asymmetric advantage through changes in operational concepts, organizational structure, and/or technologies that significantly improve warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment."
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The Air Force defined its transformation path by expanding broad transformation goals in the overarching JV2020 guidance in the Air Force Vision 2020 and finally into specific details in the Air Force Transformation Flight Plan. Air Force Vision 2020 outlines the basis for "Task Force Concepts of Operation," which are used to focus planning, programming, budgeting, requirements, and acquisition efforts. 13 The Air Force will use results from these task forces to develop and field the transformational capabilities necessary to sustain its six core warfighting competencies shown in Table 1 . Air Force doctrine defines core competencies as the areas of expertise or the specialties the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations.
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• Air and Space Superiority
• Information Superiority
• Global Attack
• Precision Engagement
• Rapid Global Mobility
• Agile Combat Support The Naval Transformation Roadmap describes how naval forces will achieve nine transformational warfighting capabilities shown in Table 2 . "Naval transformation will be captured by capitalizing on innovative concepts and technologies, and by employing processes to rapidly develop and integrate innovations into these forces." Transformational improvements in sea-based forces' precision, reach, connectivity, and decision speed will result in tightly integrated Navy-Marine Corps operations within the joint force. These enhanced naval capabilities developed through the Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing operational concepts will "produce and exploit a dispersed battlespace within which sovereign and sustainable naval, air, ground and space elements form a unified force that projects offensive power and defensive capability."
20
JOINT TRANSFORMATION PROCESS ASSESSMENT
While each of the Services progress forward with some definition of transformation to meet the OSD QDR 2001 direction, significant questions remain as to how the DoD approach will accomplish joint transformation. Some of these issues are captured in Table 3 How do we distinguish truly transformational programs, concepts and activities from those that are not?"
21
• How do we define transformation and identify its elements?
• What is the joint roadmap for Service use to satisfy JV2020 requirements?
• How do we distinguish truly transformational programs, concepts and activities from those that are not?
• How do we determine progress?
• How do we know what to fix and prioritize?
• How do we balance existing force modernization and new system development and procurement within the current budget environment?
• What is the proper role of experimentation, including in helping decide what not to acquire?
• How do we share transformational innovations, concepts and programs with allies, particularly NATO allies, so as to preserve interoperability and strengthen alliances?
• How do we ensure Service capabilities and systems are interoperable? warfare arenas and tie into the core force structure development processes including the requirements generation system, system acquisition, and planning, programming, and budgeting system. Transformation must include a set of common definitions and products that can be used across the full spectrum of Service and OSD users. This process should provide feedback on transformational initiatives to the many stakeholders including the Services, Joint
Staff, OSD, and Congress. Without a strategy or common reference framework it is impossible to determine the impacts of new operational concepts, doctrine, systems, and force structures.
We need a process to facilitate key resource decisions, deciding which programs or activities are truly transformational and how they fit into the challenge of meeting the near to mid term threat or the emerging threat in the 2010 timeframe.
25
TRANSFORMATION ENABLERS
There are several initiatives at work or under consideration that will provide the common frameworks and interface implementations so desperately needed to develop and field joint warfighting capabilities. In addition, the initiatives will be able to provide the insight necessary to make strategic transformation resourcing decisions. At this time, there are significant process changes in development affecting how the CJCS Joint Vision influences force development, DoD weapon system requirement planning, budgeting, and acquisition, as well as interoperability interface standards.
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND REQUIREMENTS TRANSFORMATION
In 2002, the CJCS recognized that the Decision Support System (DSS) consisting of the Requirements Generation System (RGS); Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); and the Acquisition Management System (AMS) needed significant changes to integrate joint warfighting requirements and interoperability. The JCS white paper "An Enterprise Architecture for Joint Warfighting: Reforming the Joint Requirements Process" described these significant changes to the Service combat capability development process. Up to this point, warfighting requirements were often developed and approved as "stand alone"
solutions to counter specific threats. In addition, Service acquisition decisions were not fully coordinated or integrated with the other Services. This was due to the fact that there was no structured method or framework to evaluate joint warfighting capabilities of competing systems, often leading to sub-optimal decisions and significant duplication.
The CJCS decided that transformation could only be achieved through a top-down approach and the logical vehicle to use was the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC)
process. 26 The CJCS directed the JROC to strengthen the DoD's ability to use the JROC process as a strategic management and integration tool and provide a method to integrate joint warfighting requirements and interoperability. 27 In parallel with this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a process to link the overarching national military strategy and Joint Vision to acquisition process changes by tying together joint operational concepts, operating and function concepts, and integrated architectures to improve joint warfighting. This is in marked difference to the "bottom up" requirements generation system the JROC has used since its inception to provide joint capabilities and reduce redundant system acquisitions. The two requirement generation approaches are contrasted in Figure 1 .
Historically, the Services have sponsored very specific stand alone requirements for joint validation leading to the acquisition of weapon systems designed to counter a specific threat.
However, the previous approach did not have any structured methodology to evaluate how competing systems across the Services would contribute to joint warfighting. 28 The left side of the diagram shows the previous requirements generation process and highlights the fact that the Combatant Commander faced the difficult task of coordinating force employment concepts well after the legacy combatant capabilities were acquired. The right side emphasizes the shift in the requirements development process to accommodate Combatant Commander influence prior to acquiring any capability. One can argue that the previous process allowed Combatant
Commanders the opportunity to influence Service requirements as they are being generated and as part of the JROC approval process. However, this requirements generating process did not address how we fight from an overarching system-of-systems perspective or operating concept. The new requirements generation system will start with a top down approach. It will be comprised of various joint combat commanders' operational concepts providing concise visualizations or mental pictures addressing strategic requirements and the scenarios to be used to defeat the adversary. Vision and Decision Support System process. Once developed, the new overarching process will provide the framework required to adequately manage and assess DoD transformation.
• 
FIGURE 2. THE LINK: JOINT VISION TO WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
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The new DSS provides the important capability to "address interoperability in terms of warfare capabilities versus the ex post facto integration of Service programs."
30 It is worthwhile to take a detailed look at the DSS process and its associated products to understand the extremely significant changes they will bring to the process of developing weapon systems and Subordinate Joint Operating Concepts (JOC) provide more focused detail in key areas.
JOCs integrate Service and component concepts in an operational-level perspective for detailed development and experimentation. They describe how a Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain a joint force along a specified range of military operations. 31 JOCs will focus on forces and functions instead of specific weapon systems.
Examples of JOCs include Rapid Decisive Operations, Homeland Defense, Combating
Terrorism, Joint Urban Operations, and National Missile Defense.
Operational concepts may be developed by any organization including the Services, Joint
Staff, Combatant Commanders, or Supporting Commanders. The development process should include representation and review by each Service and combatant command having any potential involvement in the joint operation described by the concept. Each of these concepts will be evaluated for joint warfighting potential within the Joint Vision and then, if applicable, be designated by the JROC as a joint concept for integration into the Joint Operational Concept. If a concept is not designated "joint," the sponsor can still use the concept for its designed purpose. For example, a new anti-submarine warfare concept that may not be designated joint will still be used by the Navy as a Service specific concept.
Functional concepts complement the Joint Operating Concepts. They amplify a particular function or describe how to employ a system or conduct a task across the full range of military
operations. An example is precision engagement performed by all of the Services. Functional concepts rely on Joint Operating Concepts for context. A functional concept may be specific to a particular operating concept or it may apply more broadly to multiple concepts. They also provide the detail for experiments and establish benchmarks used to measure improvement.
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Once an operating concept is approved, an integrated architecture is developed to describe its relationship within the Joint Operational Concept. Operational concepts and architectures are the frameworks used to identify the fundamental improvements in the way we want to fight. Linking concepts and architectures will better enable joint transformation by identifying capability gaps and overlaps, identifying solution possibilities, and eliminating redundant programs. 
FIGURE 3. JOINT INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE CONTSTRUCT
Architectures describe the operating concept in detail using three views: an operational view focusing on the functional perspective; a systems view focusing on the physical perspective; and the technical view focusing on standards and protocols. 36 Each of these views has a set of predefined products and data formats that can be readily shared across organizational boundaries. More importantly, mandating the use of these predefined products eliminates confusion and misunderstanding between the different organizations.
The individual architecture products are not standalone items. They represent depictions of different sets of information describing various aspects of an integrated architecture. 37 The relationships between various products are shown in figure 4 . This paper will address several products that answer transformation related questions concerning capability gaps or overlaps and interoperability requirements. • Maps Activities to Nodes
• Nodes • Activity Sequence
• Overview and Summary
Information (AV-1)
• Integrated Dictionary (AV-2)
• Overview and Summary
• Overview and Summary Information (AV-1)
• Integrated Dictionary (AV-2) 
OV -5
• Maps Activities to Nodes
• Overview and Summary
Technical Standards Architecture Products
• Data Elements 39 This framework will be a central part of making critical joint transformation capability and resource decisions. Other architecture products group systems and functions into functional or capability nodes that form the basis needed to describe interoperability requirements. The Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) and its related Systems Interface Description (SV-1) depict these. While these products address connectivity between nodes, the Systems Communication Description (SV-2) describes the specific systems that connect with other systems within nodes. The OV-2 shows which nodes must be interoperable, while SV-2 displays which systems must interface with others inside the nodes for the network to operate effectively. 
COMMS Interface
On e-wa y SA TC OM In ter fa ce interoperability requirements FIGURE 8 . NODAL ANALYSIS Finally, the last product covered in this paper is the Systems Information Exchange Matrix (SV-6). This describes, in tabular format, the information exchanges between systems within a node and between systems in differing nodes. 42 Although very detailed, this series of products are critical to identifying the key interface points that define boundaries between organizations, technologies, networks, and layers in architectures. These offer concept and architecture developers and maintainers a small number of interface specifications to manage effectively.
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This directly impacts the degree and ease to which we can be interoperable.
All of these architecture framework tools and products described above are used to facilitate coordination between requirements developers, system acquirers, and interoperability enforcers. They can be used to help clarify roles, boundaries, and interfaces between components of a larger system of systems. More importantly for joint transformation, architectures are the primary tool for enterprise level systems integration. 44 Figure 9 shows how architectures are used in a requirements and interoperability analysis process beginning with overall operational requirements and ending with a dynamic interoperability assessment. The
Information derived from architectures can be used in a systems analysis approach that is repeatable, systematic, and contributes to efficient acquisition of cost effective and interoperable military capabilities. needed is a method to effectively describe and implement interfaces in U.S. and foreign information and weapon systems that do not exist today.
Current interoperability standards, including U.S. military standards and international standardization agreements, evolved as a collection of diverse user requirements. They were not a product of a disciplined system engineering process needed to deliver a system of systems. As in the case of LINK-16 airborne data links, the standards grew out of a concept of "interoperability through non-interference" as each weapon system contractor or nation implemented the data link a little differently in order to satisfy unique weapon systems requirements. As a result, we have marginal data link interoperability and no globally agreed upon implementation strategy or timeline. Another complication comes from the acquisition streamlining effort. In order to reduce cost and acquisition overhead, Service acquisition executives have waived mandatory implementation of many military standards. Now what is often the case, is that each weapon system will implement a tailored application of a particular standard based on its specific need or funding timeline. In the international arena, it is often the case that NATO will agree to changes to the standards, but the member nations are not bound to implement these changes on their information or weapon systems. What is obvious is that the link or interface is not managed as a weapon system. The second example is more involved because it deals with how particular weapon systems manipulated data received over the data link and serves as an excellent example of current interoperability challenges. The phenomenon of multiple tracks on a single object is referred to as "dual designation" or simply "dualing." A single sensor erroneously creating more than one track on a single object can cause dualing, but is more commonly observed when multiple sensors participate in a network such as a TADIL. • Warfighter confusion about the number of actual aircraft,
• Failure to provide combat identification (CID) to unknown tracks, and
• Increased risk of cross-correlation of tracks between groups of adversary and friendly aircraft.
These observations had critical operational impacts including:
• Misallocation of limited resources,
• Fratricide -commonly caused by self-defense shots at tracks with unknown ID, and These two examples highlight interface interoperability difficulties that need to be addressed in order for the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners to be able to realize Joint Vision 2020's seamless interoperability. The commercial software community faces similar problems as technology drives software and hardware development, often out-pacing standards. As a result, standards have not kept pace with technology resulting in significant costs to update software to run on new technology machines and operate on increasingly complex networks.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is pursuing an innovative solution to move away from a standards architecture to model a model driven architecture in which the model itself specifies all of the desired, function, and behavior of the system. In its simplest sense, the model driven architecture separates functionality from implementation. This approach provides design stability as implementation technologies evolve and improve into the future.
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This approach offers unique advantages. "Standards can be protected against premature obsolescence, and the cost of maintaining interoperability in the face of software technology change can be reduced." 47 In the case of the two LINK-16 examples above, a model-driven architecture would provide a common information processing approach, eliminate ambiguity, and present the same operational picture to all users on the network. If the standards organization provided a reference model that precisely specified the interface and how the information would be processed and displayed, the implementing contractor would not have to engineer a unique implementation based on vendor hardware or proprietary software, saving considerable time and money. The analogy is very similar to today's internet protocol incorporated by all computer and software vendors. None of the personal computer hardware builders write unique code to interface with other systems on the internet. Figure 12 shows a DoD example where the model driven architecture approach is being used to solve SIAP interoperability problems such as described above. The benefits to the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners are phenomenal. Standards ambiguity would be eliminated and updates could be quickly implemented among various platforms providing interoperability.
FIGURE 12. SINGLE INTEGRATED AIR PICTURE MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE
CONCLUSION
Joint operational concepts and their associated integrated architectures will become key products in the proposed DSS by framing discussion and providing a systematic, analytical approach to address very difficult joint decisions. As shown in figure 13 on the following page, the framework can be used to identify capability gaps by developing and then analyzing architecture products. Desired functions not supported by DOTMLPF at this point will form the basis of mission needs. These needs, in turn will be addressed in a capabilities roadmap as part of the PPBS.
The JROC will be able to drive requirements at the front end of the process through validation and approval of Combatant Commander's operational concepts and architectures. It will also ensure that requirements are capability based rather than threat based as in the past.
In addition, the DSS process will greatly improve interoperability as new capabilities will be "born joint." The interface requirements as defined in the architecture products will significantly reduce expensive redesigns late in the weapons system development cycle and fielding of noninteroperable capabilities. Decision (PBD) process prior to submitting the President's defense budget to Congress. Finally, both the Services and OSD will be able to defend the budget submission to congress throughout the committee review and mark-up process. With this new process, we will be able to definitively answer the senate questions as to "How do we define transformation and identify its elements?" and "How do we distinguish truly transformational programs, concepts and activities from those that are not?" It will not be easy, but implementing this systematic approach utilizing common frameworks and interface implementations to describe, develop, and field joint operational concepts and interoperable capabilities will allow us to successfully transform to meet current and future warfighting challenges. The stakes are too high for us to continue business as usual.
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